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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the cargo transport process has improved mainly in the areas of logistics 
efficiency and documentation handling. The World Trade Centre terror attack in 2001 
changed the world and with it the conditions for logistics world-wide. The logistics 
consequences were according to[1]: It is instructive to note that these disruptions were not caused 
by the attack itself, but rather by the government’s response to the attack: closing borders, shutting 
down air traffic and evacuating buildings throughout the country. The aftermath to the attack 
brought needed attention to the vulnerability of modern supply chains. Supply chain 
vulnerability reflects sensitivity of the supply chain to disruption [2]. This vulnerability can 
in many cases be described as “unwanted effects” in the supply chain caused either by 
internal or external forces that create disturbances larger than the supply chain is designed 
to handle. The objective of Supply chain security is to prevent antagonistic threats from 
affecting the supply chain performance. Antagonistic threats and other risks and 
uncertainties are demarcated by three key words: deliberate (caused), illegal (defined by 
law), and hostile (negative impact for transport network activities) [3].  
This chapter presents first the major antagonistic threats to the supply chain and secondly 
how these threats should be prevented. This leads to the current development of different 
supply chain security programs.  
2. Supply chain and the transport network 
[4] defines the supply chain as, “The network of organisations that are involved through upstream 
and downstream relationships in the different processes and activities that produce value in the form 
of products and services in the hands of the ultimate customer”. These processes can be in 
different companies or in the same company. The different building blocks in a supply chain 
can, literally, be located throughout the world and connected through the use of a transport 
network. The transport network is designed to use economy of scale when moving products 
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from consignor to consignee in a supply chain, through nodes and links. This means the 
transport network only physically integrates the supply chain with the fulfilment of its 
transport demands [5]. Therefore, several different supply chains can be present at the same 
time and the same place in the transport network. This indicates that the relationship 
between supply chains and transport activities would be better described with complexity 
theory, especially if the interactions between components are the object of the research [3].  
Looking at transport from a system perspective, we find that logistics is made up of 
different levels, infrastructure, resources and material known as the three levels of logistics 
[6]. A logistics system consists of links and nodes, where nodes are geographically fixed 
points such as factories and terminals, while the links are the elements connecting the nodes, 
i.e., the modes of conveyance. The flow of materials is the first level of the system, because it 
is the reason for the system’s existence. Moving material from one place to another requires 
a flow of movable resources such as Lorries, trains, airplanes, and ships. These movable 
resources need infrastructure like roads, harbours, airports, and terminals [7, 8].  
The complexity in logistics can be explained by displaying the four flows always involved in 
logistics activities. The flows of material and resources are mentioned already. These two 
flows represent the “physical” part of logistics, but the other two flows, monetary stream 
and flow of information, are just as necessary to make the system work [6]. The four flows of 
logistics need geographical fixed constructions and infrastructure to fulfil the scope of 
logistics. Some of the infrastructure is owned and used exclusively by one company while 
some is co-owned or owned by governments. The four flows of logistics and the necessary 
infrastructure are the five needs for logistics fulfilment [9].  
The cargo thief aims to remove goods from the goods flow by attacking the movement of 
resources and/or the infrastructure it uses. A potential perpetrator can also utilize the 
information flow in order to better plan the theft of goods or commit a fraud which targets 
the flow of capital. This paper uses primary the three elements, flow of goods, movement of 
resources and infrastructure of the five needs for logistics fulfilments. The frame of reference 
uses the routine activity theory from criminology to explain the interaction between the 
transport network and potential perpetrators, where the theft opportunity is determent by 
each unique configuration of the five needs for logistics fulfilments and then exploited by a 
potential perpetrator. 
3. Threats to supply chains 
3.1. Usage of official macro statistics 
The usage of general statistics (mainly different types of criminal statistics) can provide a 
hint about the general criminal threat in a country or local area [9]. This fact is well known. 
Sometime is the relationship between reported crimes and public fear of crime direct whiles 
other times more indirect. Thus, it is possible that inverts that relationship and use macro 
level statistics in order to hint criminal hotspots in general. Important to remember is that 
this only provides a general hint about criminal threats and this clearly limited the 
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possibility to draw far-fetched conclusions unless more detailed data is added. A good 
indicator for criminal threats and common distrust in the society is level of corruption in a 
country [10]. The higher level of corruption, the higher is the distrust in the society and this 
may lead to a lower will to report crimes to the police. This is only a weak indicator. 
A good indicator of the violence present in a society is the number of homicides per 100 000 
citizens (lower number means safer). The average homicides rate 2007 in EU which is 1.4 in 
general but increases to 1.9 in capital cities [11]. This indicates that the country sides are 
safer than bigger cities, and the long term trend is a lower average homicides rate, which 
means a safer society (relatively). Other good indicators of criminal threats are the reported 
total number of crimes as well as the reported number of thefts and robberies. Risk rating 
(both relative and absolute) are good indicators on more transport related crimes. It is 
important to remember that each country may (are likely to) have different definition of 
crimes and guidelines for data collection [9].  
The general criminal trend in EU is that crime is declining from the pike around 1995. 
According to [11] have their being an increase in reported crimes types violent crime (up 
3%), drug trafficking and robbery (both up 1%) in the period 1998-2007. During the same 
period has seen a decrease in motor vehicle crimes (down 7%) and domestic burglary (down 
3%). There seems to be a time difference between countries in the trend but nevertheless the 
declining in reported crimes and even criminal patterns are surprisingly similar between 
member states [12]. The reason for this decline is according [12] the “changing demographics, 
among other factors, have played a causal role in the decreases in crime across the Western world. 
Since the bulk of common crimes are committed by young males”. There is also a suggestion that 
the better policing and/or more severe sentencing contributes to the declining criminal trend 
[12]. The different official statistics supports these conclusions.  
3.2. Shrinkage and theft 
The term inventory shrinkage is the loss of products between the point of manufacturing or 
purchase from supplier and the point of sale. According to [13], the average shrinkage rate is 
1,8 percent of total annual sales. This means a total loss of $33,21 billion annually in the U.S. 
The report points out four major sources of shrinkage: employee theft, shoplifting, 
administrative error, and vendor fraud. Therefore, three of four sources for shrinkage are 
criminal actions. The losses in the European fast moving consumer goods are for 26 percent 
in manufacturing, 8 percent in distribution, and 66 percent in retail [14]. Shrinkage during 
distribution/transport is approximately 0,14 percent of annual sales for all types of products. 
According [15] is the worldwide loss ratio as 0,025 percent of the total revenue ($307 billion 
revenue and $77 million in losses). Benchmark participant loss rates varied from 0,0038 
percent to 0,25 percent of total revenue. The three different reports [13, 14, 15] indicate that 
the annual shrinkage during distribution/transport would be 0,025 percent to 0,14 percent of 
annual sales. This loss ratio is compared with the loss ratio for retailers (1,75 percent) and 
manufacturers (0,56 percent) [14]. 
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There is a significant problem with the theft of cargo worldwide. It is estimated that theft 
represents a loss of at least US$10 billion per year in the United States and US$30 billion 
worldwide [16]. The value of cargo theft for the European Union is estimated to be €8.2 
billion annually, an average value of € 6.72 per trip [17]. Gathering accurate numbers for 
cargo theft losses is difficult or impossible in many cases, due to limited reporting by the 
transport industry and the lack of a national law enforcement system requiring reporting 
and tracking uniformity [18]. Despite these figures, cargo theft generally has a low priority 
status in most countries and is often perceived largely as the cost of doing business. 
A problem related to cargo theft is the theft of vehicles and the lorry-driver’s private 
property. There are many reasons behind a truck theft, but they can be described basically 
with three main characteristics - value, cargo carrying ability, and valuable documents [3]. 
The first characteristic, value, represents the truck’s value as all objects and can be sold and 
exchanged for money. The second characteristic, carrying ability, refers to the general propose 
of a truck. The vehicle and its load were targeted in 63 percent of the attacks [19]. The truck 
can be stolen with the current load where the goods are the desirable object and the truck is 
only the simplest method to move the goods to a warehouse or to another truck for further 
movement. A truck also can be stolen for other criminal activities. 
The third characteristic of theft problems toward freight is the attack for the lorry-driver’s 
private property or other types of valuable documents such as credit cards, mobile phones, 
and digital cameras stored in the truck during transport. According [19], 17 percent of all 
drivers suffered an attack during the past five years, 30 percent were attacked more than 
once. Of all drivers attacked, 21 percent reported they were physically assaulted during the 
attack [19]. This type of attack represents a considerable amount of the total, but nothing 
was stolen in 38 percent of attacks against trucks [20]. However, even if nothing was stolen 
it was still a crime against a part of the transport network and therefore shall be seen as an 
antagonistic threat. 70 percent of attacks against road transports occur between 22:00 in the 
evening and 06:00 in the morning [19]. Therefore, it is possible to state that time of day plays 
an important role in antagonistic threats. According [19], the direct cost for an attack is 
approximately €25000 per attack, including theft of vehicles, load and the driver’s personal 
belongings. 
Regardless of which of the three characteristics of theft problems the motivated perpetrator 
uses, there is a number of commonly defined modus operandi or methods to attack trucks. 
These different modus operandi are used differently depending on where the attack is 
executed. The different locations are described in terms of different steps in a road transport 
from consignor to consignee, which starts with loading the goods and ends when unloading 
them. Eurowatch has developed a threat/risk matrix based on the data on cargo theft in road 
transports over a seven-year period [23]. The matrix presented in Table 1 maps modus 
operandi and location of attacks against each other.  
A quick analysis of the matrix points out some obvious relationships. The method fake 
accident is best suited to deceive a truck driver to stop during driving and then conversion to 
a hijack. The same course of events can be created with the use of fake police tactics. The 
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threat/risk matrix points out the most dangerous location to be near end location or at insecure 
parking depending on which modus operandi is considered most threatening.  
 Hijack Robbery 
Theft 
from 
vehicle 
Theft of 
vehicle 
Fake 
police 
Fake 
accident 
Deception 
Load point 2 3 2 3 1 1 4 
Driving 4 1 1 1 4 4 2 
Insecure 
parking 
2 4 4 4 3 1 2 
Secure 
parking 
2 2 3 3 1 1 2 
Near end 
Location 
4 3 3 4 3 1 3 
Unload 
point 
2 3 2 3 1 1 4 
Table 1. Threat/risk matrix, road transport using Eurowatch data 2002-2009, 4 represents the highest 
risk [23] 
The greatest source of risk for businesses is trusted insiders [21]. Some authors consider 
insiders to be involved in approximately 60 percent of all losses [22]. According to [23] is 65 
percent of all “whole load losses” related to the use of inside information. Others claim there 
are no reliable figures [24]. This is interesting when considering the fact that most 
countermeasures are implemented to reduce external theft [25]. An internal perpetrator acts 
not randomly or in an unstructured way, but more as a response to social and 
environmental factors present in the work environment [22]. According [26] is the 
complexity around insiders and drivers expressed: “Some estimates indicate a high level of 
driver involvement, but drivers are possibly the weakest link in the security of the supply chain. They 
are also the first line of defence and there is a need to train and educate them on cargo crime and 
personal safety issues whilst on the road.” This leads to that the potential perpetrator both can 
be external to and internally involved in the supply and/or the transport chain. 
3.3. Terrorism 
The word “terror” is a Latin word meaning “to frighten.” Consequently, a terrorist is a 
person that intends to frighten others through fear. The term terrorist/terrorism is itself 
controversial because its key signature is political and it has been used by states to 
illegitimatize political opponents. This leads to a vindication of the state's own use of terror 
against its opponents [27]. The lack of a universal definition of consequence of this is best 
explained with the cynical comment “that one state's terrorist is another state's freedom fighter”. 
Regardless, terrorism is definition by [28] as, “Terrorism is not an ideology or movement, but a 
tactic or a method for attaining political goals. Terrorism is one of the major obstacles for 
meaningful international countermeasures.  
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The World Trade Centre terror attack in 2001 changed the world and the conditions for 
logistics worldwide. The aftermath of the terrorist attacks clearly indicated that logistics 
operations will suffer consequences of an attack. [29] state that, “over the longer term, there 
is a question of whether the attacks can have a negative impact on productivity by raising the costs 
of transactions through increased security measures, higher insurance premiums, and the 
increased costs of financial and other counterterrorism regulations”. The motivation for the 
majority of terrorist attacks is because the perpetrator intends to influence and alter the 
current balance of power in a certain direction [30]. Both the current balance of power and 
the potential effects on it may only be understood within the perpetrator’s own mind. 
Therefore, the non-economically driven antagonistic threat is more nuanced, uncertain, 
and harder to predict that other types of antagonistic threats. According to [31] the fear 
for terrorist attacks is an extreme form of perceived risk. The definition of terrorism 
influences the difficulty to present valid statistics for the category, because one source 
may classify an incident as a terrorist act while another considers it to be a “regular” 
crime. According [28] is the official reported number of terrorism attack in EU declining 
(581 attacks in 2007 and 294 attacks in 2009) and the major threat (in numbers) comes for 
separatist movements (Basque and Corsican) whiles Islamist terrorism is still perceived as 
the biggest threat.  
The modern or new thing with terrorism is not the use of violence to influence and alter the 
current balance of power in a certain direction. According to [32] is: “Terrorism in all its 
forms, by its very nature, an asymmetrical response to superior force, and terrorist have always used 
their capabilities as force multipliers – usually through the exploitation of terror. The generation of 
fear, in effect the use of purposeful violence as a form of psychological warfare can now be carried 
much further, enhanced by the modern media and the proliferation of mass media as much as by the 
proliferation of weapons”. The new thing with terrorism is therefore more related to 
development in media technologies than to vulnerabilities in supply chains. Nevertheless, 
terrorism is a special form of antagonistic threat that needs to be managed, in one way or 
another. 
Reviewing official terrorist statistics from one global source (MIPT Terrorism Knowledge 
Base) leads to the following transport related conclusions: 
 Transport activities represent 4% of the targets in 2006 and 5% in 2007. 
 The main modus operandi for attacks is armed attack (38% 2006 and 31% 2007) and 
bombing (51% 2006 and 54% 2007). 
 The main area for terrorist attacks are Middle East/Persian Gulf (68% 2006), and Asia 
(24% 2006). 
The terrorists prefer to use bombs and armed attacks because 80-90 percent of all attacks 
used these tactics. The targets are rarely transports but more in form of police and other 
governmental or religious institutions (~53% of the attack 2006). The interesting feature is 
related to the geographic side of terrorism, because the terrorist threat is mainly linked to 
local/country/regional contexts. 
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The official statistics for terrorist attacks indicates that, in order to understand terrorists, it is 
better to focus on possible attacks instead of probability for attacks. In accordance with this, 
there is no objective [33] way to determine who is a terrorist and who is not. It has all to do 
with the context to the terrorist threat. This follows the same logic when terrorism is 
presented as black swan problem [34]. Nevertheless direct and indirect effects from a 
terrorist attack or threat will affect the global flow of goods and thereby, to different extent, 
the global economy.  
3.4. Smuggling of goods 
The primary target of illegal goods is the black market. The black market consists of places 
and situations where products with doubtful or no legality are traded for money. This 
market is subject to the same forces of supply and demand as legal ones. Buyers of these 
illegal products are everywhere. Statistical reports show that counterfeited and pirated 
items amounted to $176 billion in Europe in 2007 [35]. According to [36], in 2006, nearly 3 
million pharmaceutical products were found to be counterfeit. Product smuggling does not 
necessarily mean that the product is illegal everywhere. What is legal in one country can be 
illegal in another, which creates the possibility that the actors in smuggling can be legal 
companies that are trying to access a market that is prohibited for them. An example of this 
is Western companies that smuggled products into former communist countries during the 
Cold War era. 
The supply of a typical black market (both authorities and customers knows that the 
product is illegal) can be illustrated with the illegal smuggling of cocaine to USA. The 
illegal drug supply chains come mainly from South America. This depends on that the 
raw material, coca leaf, is grown there. The smugglers use land, sea, and air routes to get 
past US authorities. The whole distribution of cocaine is controlled by Colombian-based 
organized crime, but in recent years it has started to cooperate with Mexican criminals to 
streamline the logistics and share the risks. The Colombians have organized their 
operations in a business-like manner, creating cells for special purposes like 
warehousing or transport [37]. According [38], the illegal drug markets are best 
understood as having high adaptation and great resilience to always supply their 
products to the end user. This resilience and adaptive ability is clearly found in the 
logistics system setup and can be understood and explained with the concept of risk for 
detection presented in this paper. 
The supply of a typical gray market (only authorities know that the product is illegal) can 
be illustrated with the illegal smuggling of counterfeited products. The gray market 
involves the diversion of goods from legitimate supply chains [39]. The only distinction is 
the risk for discovery from the authorities or the company whose products are copied. 
This diversity leads to a different design of the supply chain. The location of the 
production facilities is subject to the risk of discovery. Normally, counterfeited production 
units are placed where the risk for detection is low combined with the normal business 
problem as different types of costs and quality aspects. A counterfeited supply chain uses 
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the freight routes and port activities in the same way as legal supply chain does. Among 
the receiver countries, Europe and the US are favorites, just as Africa is the favorite for 
transit activities. Confiscated products that have not been produced in Africa, like jewelry 
and CDs, show this, because the African market does not have the ability, in general, to 
buy that type of product. Countries in Central and South America act like magnets for 
counterfeited products. Purchases of counterfeited goods to launder money occur in 
larger numbers there than anywhere else in the world [40]. Large stocks of illegitimate 
products are easily shipped from parts of South America to Central America, where they 
are big consumers of that type of product. Organized crime also uses Central America as 
the base for shipments of illegitimate goods to North America. The situation in Europe 
makes it the most lucrative market for counterfeited products. The types of confiscated 
goods at the external borders of the EU are different from other places in the world. This 
indicates that the dealers of counterfeited products adjust products to each market’s 
special condition. They look at the fashion, culture, and buying habits of individual 
countries [40].  
Both types of Illegal supply chains use the international flow of containers to transport their 
products all over the world, regardless if the product is counterfeited or an illegal drug. 
Criminals try to delude customs’ watchfulness by "breaking" their way through from the 
area of production to the area of supply, and avoiding direct paths that are well known to 
the authorities. 
A problem linked to smuggling is the manufacturing of products without intellectual rights, 
or the production of counterfeited goods. Everything that has been produced can be 
reproduced by someone else. In order to bring counterfeited products from the production 
site to the end user, they may have to cross several national boundaries as well as 
intellectual property legislation. The counterfeiting business evolves constantly within 
current trends and technologies. The production and distribution of illegal products is 
performed under the risk for detection and this diversity leads to a different design of the 
supply chain [41]. The location of the production facilities is subject to the risk of discovery. 
Normally, illegal production units are placed where the risk for detection is low, in line with 
the normal legal business problem of where to produce according to different types of costs 
and quality aspects. Then, the illegal products are distributed by trade routes and port 
activities in the same way as legal products [42]. The pollution of illegal products in the legal 
transport network is a serious problem. The most common countermeasure against 
smuggling is the inspection of cargo carriers when they cross a national border. The mere 
existence of these inspections creates disturbances in the transport network, even if no 
illegal product is discovered. 
The counterfeiting business evolves constantly within current trends and technologies. The 
illegal products are then distributed by trade routes and port activities in the same way as 
legal products [42]. According [43], the discourse on the gray market is filled with the idea 
of a criminal underworld in order to separate it from the legal/normal upper-world. In 
reality is it very difficult to establish the underworld/upper-world image. The legal 
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companies naturally are not pleased with the competition from black market actors. They 
may not be pleased with legal competition either, but that is another question. Striving for 
better business deals and the globalization trend that started centuries ago led to an 
embedment of illegal actions within legal markets [42]. This implies that the old black 
markets have been integrated with legal transactions, and today’s markets contain every 
shade of gray when referring to the legality of the markets as a whole [42]. Legal businesses 
are concerned especially with the problems of counterfeit branded products and the theft of 
their own products. To increase the efficiency of detecting counterfeited products, legal 
businesses use cutting-edge technology and security actions [97]. 
3.5. Piracy 
The modern types of pirates do not act officially of any specific courtiers’ order but research 
has indicated relationship between piracy and weakness of central governances [44]. In 
essence is piracy an international crime against all states and the perpetrators can be 
brought to justice in all everywhere [45]. In recent years has the threat from piracy against 
sea shipment (direct threat) and also against the different supply chains utilizing sea 
shipment (indirect threat) received increasing attention [44, 46, 47, 48]. The real increasing 
threat from pirates, primary at the horn of Africa [45, 47], has resulted into both a changes in 
shipping routes (Sullivan, 2010) and also a naval response from several countries [46] that 
are depended on a smooth passage of cargo carrying ships. According [49], was there 489 
attacks last year (2010) and over a twelve year period was there about 347 attacks/year 
globally [43]. Piracy is an increasing problem, especially near Somalia [48]. The pirates are 
changing their tactics and targets to use more sophisticated weaponry and apply more 
advanced techniques, all in order to improve their own success ratio. Table 2 presents the 
current trends and patterns in piracy. 
 
Year Number
of acts 
Lives
lost 
Wounded
crew 
Missing
crew 
Crew
hostage/ 
Kidnapped
Crew
assaulted
Ships
hijacked 
Ships 
missing 
2006 254 17 23 0 224 225 10 0 
2007 310 22 75 57 223 39 18 0 
2008 330 6 22 38 773 21 47 1 
2009 406 8 57 9 746 2 56 2 
2010 489 1 27 0 1027 30 57 12 
Table 2. Trends and numbers in piracy 2006-2010 [48] 
As stated in table 2, piracy is an increasing threat and especially alarming is the increasing 
use of violent and kidnapping of crew members. According to [48], piracy cost the maritime 
industry between 7 - 12 billion dollars a year. In addition to this shall also the cost for 
rerouting to avoid pirate infested waters, ransom payments and support from various 
organizations be added. 
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4. Preventing the threats - solutions 
4.1. Interdisciplinary research mixing criminology into logistics 
According to several authors [50, 51, 52], criminology is interdisciplinary research of the 
history and future of crimes, and this paper follows this tradition by using theories from 
criminology to strengthen the field of logistics. This mix of theories also challenges the 
predominant research approach in logistics related to tangible artefacts [53], and human 
intervention or influence to a smaller extent [54]. The reason for this approach is that 
violation of law is considered a human attribute. Criminology distinguishes three elements 
of a crime that are present in all sorts of crime ranging from occasional violence to advance 
and complex economic crimes [55, 56, 57]. The elements are: 
1. Motivated perpetrator 
2. Suitable object 
3. Lack of capable guardian  
These three different elements can be described as: 
Motivated perpetrator: The perpetrator is an individual that, based on the outcome of the own 
decision process, commits a certain action or prepares for a certain action that is prohibited by 
locality or country of international law. The perpetrator can be modelled with two different 
categories depending on how decisions are made by each individual, namely rational choice 
theory (also known as the economical man theory) or determinism [54, 58]. It is commonly 
agreed that different crimes demand various mixtures of rational choice and determinism 
from the perpetrator’s side, where crimes of passion (sexual crime, etc.) are considered more 
deterministic than property crimes (economic crime, etc.), which are more rational [59]. Thus, 
therefore can the general description of human behaviour be described as acting rational on 
the margin or limited (by circumstance, choice or mixture of both) rational choice [60, 61]. 
Object: The desirable outcomes or objects for the motivated perpetrator differ greatly 
depending on the motivated perpetrator’s decision process. Normally is it suitable to 
describe the object as the primary or direct reason for the action, but also as secondary or 
indirect reasons [56]. The primary objects can be shipped products, resources used, 
infrastructure, or even the media attention an attack will receive (terrorist attacks, action 
junkies etc.). It is in the relationship between object and motivated perpetrator that the 
categorisation of the antagonistic threat is found [3]. 
Lack of capable guardian: The preventive measures that can be induced to alter the motivated 
perpetrator’s decision process are called security [62]. If the security measures are 
considered insufficient by the motivated perpetrator, then there is nothing to prevent the 
crime [56].  
Most important to remember about the elements of crime is that it is first when all three 
elements comes together at the same time that a crime is possible. This means that if one of 
the three elements is missing than is crime impossible. Any combination of lack of security 
and target are normally referred to as a crime opportunity.  
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4.2. Opportunity to crime 
Crime opportunity is a cornerstone of criminal behaviour. There are ten crime opportunity 
principles as follows [63]: 
1. Opportunity plays a role in causing all crimes, 
2. Crime opportunities are highly specific, 
3. Crime opportunities are concentrated in time and place, 
4. Crime opportunities depend on everyday movements, 
5. One crime produces opportunities for another, 
6. Some products offer more tempting crime opportunities, 
7. Social and technological changes produce new crime opportunities, 
8. Opportunities for crime can be reduced, 
9. Reducing opportunities does not usually displace crime, 
10. Focused opportunity reduction can produce wider declines in crime. 
Some of these principles are self-explanatory and easy to understand. All of them are valid 
for every type of crime and therefore they are also valid for crimes committed against the 
transport network. The more interesting examples of these opportunities will be explained 
and described later in this thesis. The most important thing to remember about crime 
opportunity is that an opportunity alone does not explain why a crime occurs because a 
crime needs a motivated perpetrator and opportunity to occur [64]. The theory of crime 
opportunity also refers to the fourth principle of microeconomics [57] - people respond to 
incentives - and there the degree of necessary opportunity or incentive depends on the 
individual. The incentives could range from vindication to morality, ethics, altruism, or 
determinism [3, 64]. Altogether, this leads to that the relationship between threats 
(motivated perpetrator) and countermeasures (security) linked around a desirable outcome 
or object, are complex and contextual depended. 
4.3. The two different outlooks on mankind in criminology 
It is possible to separate mankind into two different categories, depending on how decisions 
are made. This separation is a theoretical construction and its validity varies for every 
person in every situation. 
Modern criminology uses rational choice theory as the basis for research. Rational choice 
theory, also known as rational action theory, is a framework for describing and modeling 
social and economic behavior. This theory originates in the idea of the economic man in 
economic research, primarily microeconomics. This theoretical model is also central in 
modern political science and scientific fields such as sociology and philosophy. Rational 
choice theory assumes that individuals choose the best action according to the constraints, 
opportunities, functions, and abilities they face. Today, rational choice theory in 
microeconomics is defined best with the first four principles of microeconomics [58]. In 
short, the theory states that every presumed criminal is should be considered a rational 
person who makes decisions about potential crime from relationships between the benefits 
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of the crime and the troubles and risk it brings. By increasing the perceived trouble and/or 
risk, it is possible to reduce criminal activity with this perspective [55]. 
The opposite of rational choice is determinism. The idea is that the course of events depends 
completely on existing conditions. This approach refuses the idea of free will - everything is 
predetermined. In reality, every individual is a mixture of their ability to be influenced and 
the lawful. Among social scientists today, the idea of restricted free will is a common and 
useful insight. The cause of these restrictions can be found in the individual biological or 
psychological vulnerability, way of life, upbringing, social group, ethnic background, or 
society in which the individual lives, and how this affects his or her life with regard to their 
ethnic background, gender, and social position [55].  
These opposing perspectives of the human being as either the master of his own life or as a 
victim of circumstance can be found in every aspect of criminology. This contrast affects not 
only how we see the causes of criminal behaviour, but is also important with respect to the 
social response to criminal behaviour [55]. According to [65], the current approach toward 
crime, punishment, and pardon is a good way to understand the surrounding society. It is 
commonly agreed that different crimes demand various mixtures of rational choice and 
determinism from the perpetrator’s side, where crimes of passion (sexual crime, etc.) are 
considered more deterministic than property crimes (economic crime, etc.), which are more 
rational. That being said, the big difference appears when discussing the possible 
punishment for a certain crime. If an individual is responsible for his or her actions (rational 
choice), then the possible punishment will deter the crime; however, if the individual is a 
victim of circumstance (determinism), then it is useless to punish the individual. Therefore 
all crime prevention methods assume that an individual is responsible for his own actions 
and that he can perceive the consequences of those actions. The big question for the rational 
choice perspective is how each individual estimates the risk in a rational way. An individual 
that has received a formal or perceived punishment for an action previously should be less 
likely to commit that action again. The outcome of a formal punishment on the perception of 
risk is mixed [66] and each individual should be considered not rational, but to act rationally 
on the margin [3].  
4.4. Criminal prosecution and punishment  
This discussion of the two outlooks on mankind in criminology clearly demonstrates the 
need to add theories from criminology into logistics. Several logistics authors claim that the 
weak prosecution of criminals is one reason behind the increasing need for security [16, 67, 
68]. In the context of the two outlooks on mankind in criminology, [16, 67, 68], state the 
threats against logistics activities is simply based on the rational choice theory, while 
authors in criminology [55, 63, 66, 72, 74] refer to an individual acting rationally on the 
margin which eliminates the deterring effect of potential punishment that [16, 67, 68] 
suggest. The deterrent effect that a punishment can have on a perpetrator not to commit a 
certain crime is very low, due to that the perpetrators do not plan to get captured. Therefore 
has the risk for detection a bigger deterrent effect that the potential punishment [41]. The 
 
Supply Chain Security – Threats and Solutions 169 
authors’ [16, 67, 68] request for stronger prosecution of criminals can be seen as a way to 
understand the surrounding society in general [65]. Compare that to [69] who state that risk 
management and TQM systems are normally linked to a punishment and reward system for 
the users. The difference between legal prosecution achieved by a state and a punishment 
and reward system controlled by a company or similar organization is that legal prosecution 
involves a weaker relationship between action and consequence for the perpetrator.  
4.5. Perpetrator, opportunity and security  
The relationship between security and opportunity is the predominant understanding of 
security in different contexts. This depends on the premise that security only can deter or 
repel a motivated perpetrator from committing a crime by limiting the opportunities for a 
certain crime. The most important thing to remember with crime opportunities is that an 
opportunity alone does not explain why a crime occurs because a crime needs a motivated 
perpetrator and opportunity to occur [62]. Opportunity plays a role in causing crime, and 
these opportunities are highly specific, concentrated in time and place, and depend on 
everyday movements. These opportunities can be reduced and focused opportunity 
reduction can produce wider declines in crime. It is the theory behind security. The real 
problem occurs when an organisation’s security capability is lower than the capability of the 
potential perpetrator. The driving force within each potential perpetrator can be vindication 
from morality, ethics, altruism, or determinism. Therefore, the relationship between security 
and opportunity must be understood from the viewpoint that the parties involved 
(stakeholders, actors, and humans) have different individual incentives to exploit 
opportunity that security needs to address. Consequently, security cannot be seen as only 
opportunity limiting but also as incentive limiting, making security a preventive factor on 
both sides of the opportunity (pre- and post-event).  
Crime opportunities depend on routines or predictability within certain boundaries. This is 
the routine activity perspective in criminology and it argues that normal movement and 
other routine activities play a significant role in potential crime. The routine activity theory 
states that potential perpetrators may seek locations where their victims or targets are 
numerous, available, convenient, and/or vulnerable. [70] uses the illustration of “how lions 
look for deer near their watering hole” to explain the practical relevance of the routine activity 
perspective. Social disorganization in combination with the routine activity theory can 
provide a wider and better explanation of property crime.  
4.6. Incident preventing 
The security of freight transport was long under-developed, but since terminal security has 
improved, theft incidents have increased in the links between terminals [71]. This 
development is also valid from a supply chain perspective; while security in manufacturing 
facilities normally is focused and well-managed, the rest of the chain is without security 
[72]. Security during transport is necessary to prevent unwanted negative disruption in the 
flow of goods. Transport security means the interaction between physical obstructing 
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artifacts (locks, fences, Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) etc.) and the intervention of 
humans, with the aim of reducing theft, sabotage and other types of illegal activity. The 
technological development of the range and sophistication of anti-theft devices and after-
theft systems is increasing rapidly [73]. There are different preventive methods that can be 
used to reduce the risk of a cargo theft incident, but the primary method is to use physical 
security countermeasures correctly (fences, locks, seals, guards etc). The objectives for these 
types of countermeasures are to make the theft both harder and riskier to commit. The next 
important countermeasure is the control and trust of employees in the company. This 
method targets the internal theft problem and can be subdivided in two parts: present 
employees’ supervision and new employee reference checks [74]. 
The configuration of transport networks leads to the need for security measures in different 
forms, depending on the exact function and appearance of each nod and link. All different 
theft preventive methods used can be explained with the basic theory of situational crime 
prevention. The aim is to reduce factors specific to different types of crimes, locations and 
situations. The key issue in situational crime prevention is the recognition that a crime often 
reflects the risk, effort and the payoff as assessed by the perpetrator [75]. The theory does not 
state that a perpetrator will commit a crime every time an opportunity occurs. Rather, the 
potential perpetrator makes a calculated decision about the opportunity to commit a crime 
[76]. In short, a perpetrator acts according to the rational choice theory, seeking to maximize 
its utility with regards to a particular time and available resources. Since cargo theft is a 
property crime, situational crime prevention is a useful method to address this problem. 
Basically this is achieved by applying the following three prevention principles [77]: 
Increased perceived effort [78] – Motivation to commit a theft is reduced if the perpetrator 
believes the crime is too hard to commit. Preventive actions based on this idea can be 
categorized as physical separation of the potential perpetrator and the object of the theft. 
This can be accomplished through the use of access control and physical barriers (fences, 
locks, etc.).  
Increased perceived risks [70] – If perpetrators think they will get away with a theft, it is more 
likely they will commit it. By increasing the risk for perpetrators they are less likely to 
commit a theft. This can be accomplished with surveillance systems, security personnel, and 
by increasing employee’s security awareness. 
Reducing anticipated rewards [70] – People are more likely to commit a theft if they can benefit 
from it. By making the target for the theft worthless or reducing its resale value it becomes 
less attractive for potential perpetrators. This can be accomplished by marking the goods 
with unique numbers or a product destruction device. Good examples of this principle are 
the safety cases used in transports of valuables and money and the ink tags used in fashion 
stores. 
[71] added a fourth preventive principle based on rational choice theory: 
Inducing guilt or shame – A theft is more likely to occur if it can be excused by appeal to 
reasons such as “the company can afford it” or “I’ve worked hard for the company but they 
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have not thanked me for it” [79]. This is a form of ethic relativity. Companies and 
organizations can affect this ethic relativity by using company rules, signs, and regulations 
that demonstrate the right moral values. When theft is seen as an additional wage benefit for 
employees, this preventive action has failed [24]. By appealing to people’s morals and 
making it easy for them to do the right thing, it will be more difficult to make excuses [71]. 
Some of the criticism against situational crime prevention states that this method leads to 
property crime receiving more attention than is appropriate. Furthermore, situational crime 
prevention addresses the symptom and not the cause of the crime. This can lead to an 
excessive trust in technology [80]. Both of these criticisms are valid for the usage of 
situational crime prevention to hinder cargo theft. This may explain the over confidence in 
technology in order to prevent terrorism due to that terrorism is not a property crime and 
therefore has the use of technology an even lower impact on reducing the threat than for a 
cargo theft incident. The prevention of incidents are traditionally closely linked to the 
definition of security as a show of force which leads to that security work becomes symbolised 
with uniformed guards and normal police duties [81]. In order to include impact reduction 
in the term security is the second definition, freedom from danger, better to use. This definition 
embraces all things that allow the organization to act and carryout the business “free from 
danger”. This is from this view point the supply chain security shall be understood.  
4.7. Crime displacement 
The theory of crime displacement says that crime prevention in one area may have 
unintentional consequences in other areas or situations. Therefore, crime prevention may 
not lead to an absolute reduction in crime. The theory of crime displacement is based on 
rational choice theory, with the following three assumptions about the potential perpetrator 
and target [69]:  
Crime displacement assumes that crime is inelastic [82] - This assumption indicates that the 
demand for crime is unaffected by preventive efforts. This is not true because all crimes are 
more or less elastic [83]. Professional criminals are more inelastic while opportunistic 
criminals are more elastic [75]. 
The perpetrator has mobility [75] - Perpetrators have flexibility relative to time, place, method, 
and type of crime. In reality, perpetrators are limited in their mobility, adaptability, and 
flexibility relative to a particular crime, place, time, and method [76]. 
There exist unlimited numbers of alternative targets [84] - The perpetrators have unlimited 
numbers and types of potential targets to choose from. In reality, the number of targets is 
limited in one way or another [76]. 
The theory of crime displacement states that rational thinking perpetrators with crime 
mobility will alter their behaviour in response to crime prevention efforts [69]. Crime 
displacement will only occur when the alternative crime has a similar cost-benefit structure 
rationalised within the perpetrator’s decision process [85]. Based on the ten principles of 
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theft opportunities presented earlier in this thesis and the configuration of the transport 
network, it is obvious that all opportunities cannot be eliminated, but they can be reduced 
by applying substantive preventive countermeasures. The object is to reduce crime 
opportunities which will lead to a change in potential theft situations. Therefore crime 
displacement is a valid theory [75].  
Crime displacement can occur in several ways. [75] uses five types of displacement - crime, 
target, method, place, and time. [86] add another type of displacement, the perpetrator. The 
six types of displacement are explained below [65]:  
Crime:  Transfer to other types of crime 
  Ex: offenders stop doing robberies and instead commit burglaries. 
Target:  Transfer to other types of goods  
  Ex: offenders stop taking goods and instead target money transports. 
Method: Better locking devices force the offender to be more innovative 
  Ex: better doors force the offender to break-in through the windows.  
Place:  Transfer to a less protected target in the same or other areas 
  Ex: if one area improves security then the offender attacks another area.  
Time:  Transfer to different times of the day 
  Ex: better night security forces the offenders to strike during daytime. 
Perpetrator: Transfer to another perpetrator 
  Ex: Preventing one offender can create an opportunity for another offender.  
The theory of crime displacement does not explain why perpetrators commit a certain crime 
or why some crimes are more attractive than others. Furthermore, it does not explain the 
perpetrator’s perceptions and reactions to changes in opportunities [76]. Crime 
displacement is one probable explanation of why criminal patterns change in a certain 
system. A practical statement about crime displacement is that if perpetrators have the ability, 
mobility, and flexibility to exploit the weakest link in the chain, they will do so. It is the 
perpetrator’s ability to organize a successful crime and their relationship relative to the 
actors within the transport network that are the fundamental variables for categorizing 
perpetrators.  
4.8. Logistics, risk management and criminology 
The three terms security, risk management, and crime prevention often are considered 
similar and always work together [61, 74]. This idea suggests that security and risk 
management are good from an ethics point of view because they reduce crime; therefore, 
more or better security or risk management will reduce crime. The problem here is that 
crime is defined by a law according to the principle “no crime without a law” [54], while 
security or risk management has no philosophical attachment to law. Therefore, people on 
both sides of the law can have better security or risk management and that security and risk 
management are not necessary against crime.  
 
Supply Chain Security – Threats and Solutions 173 
Security for an individual or a group of individuals can, if unrestricted, jeopardise the 
security of others by threatening them or transferring threats to them. This type of 
discussion can be found with philosophers such as Hobbes and Mills. Unbounded or 
unrestricted individual security could threaten the authority of a state. This problem is 
demonstrated in the current debate about individual and private secure communication 
encryption, which some states want to make illegal unless they can break them. Taking this 
into account, a security problem may or may not be a legal problem. As a concept, security 
involves a protector or guardian and a threat against an asset or object [74]. This threat can 
be from either side of the law. To obtain the right security, it is vital to answer who is 
protecting what, from whom, in which situation, to what extent, and to what consequence 
[61]. Security can be seen as contextual risk management [3].  
Contextual and statistical risk management approaches as crime prevention methods work 
in different ways and address different types of potential perpetrators. This demonstrates 
the difference in the philosophical views of contextual and statistical risk management. 
Statistical risk management needs a fairly predictable world, or at least a larger amount of 
trustworthy statistics. Since previous events or incidents are the basis of statistical risk 
management, it cannot deal effectively with a self-inflicted alteration of the threat pattern. 
Therefore, statistical risk management is effective in crime prevention if the potential 
perpetrators are limited to unsophisticated and indifferent methods based on opportunistic 
behaviour [87]. However, as potential perpetrators become more sophisticated and gain 
more capability, the accuracy of statistical prediction will reduce dramatically. Antagonistic 
perpetrators study the victim to discover routines and regularities and improve their skills 
with this knowledge (planning, technologies, and tactics) to maximize their likelihood for 
success [88]. The prevention of antagonistic threats by following current business trends 
makes the system even more predictable. Military special forces and similar organizations 
have proven this time after time [75]. 
4.9. Transfer of the effect from antagonistic threats 
The mitigation of antagonistic threats refers to strategies to transfer the economic impact to 
another organisation/company. The basic idea is that by transferring the risk to someone 
else through different types of contracts, it reduces personal risk substantially [89, 90]. The 
contractual agreements are divided into two different categories - insurance policies and 
non-insurance contractual agreements between two organisations. Good risk transfer 
strategy is composed normally of both types of risk transfer. 
Transfer of risk by usage of insurance: The insurance principle prescribes that the insurance 
company takes over the economic impact if something happens that is covered by the 
insurance contract. Therefore, the risk of this event needs to be rather easy to identify, 
classify, and determine for the insurance company to estimate the cost related to the risk 
and determine the insurance premium. This premium is also accompanied by an 
insurance excess, giving the potential insurance buyer three components to consider: the 
terms, premium, and excess of specific insurance. The incentive for each individual 
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insurance buyer is the central issue, and in extension, also the potential reduction of a 
potential loss [3, 91].  
Today special insurance policies exist for everything from cargo damage and machinery 
breakdown to terrorism, war, and general consequence liability. Typically, all insist on 
special events to be considered valid for a certain incident. Sometimes the terms are so 
specific that different types of insurance are valid depending on the cause of the incident. 
One of the best examples is the often-conflicting terms in terrorism contra war insurance. If 
there is a recognized government behind the incident, then war insurance is valid, but if the 
incident is caused by someone else, it is the terrorism insurance policy that covers the 
economic impact. This also depends on the different terms that each insurance company has 
in their product [3]. 
Transfer of risk by usage of business power: This risk transfer strategy is commonly used 
between contractual partners, but is rarely mentioned because it opposes the belief that 
everybody wants to collaborate fairly and for the greater good [92, 93, 94, 95]. The general 
idea of this risk transfer strategy is to use the business power of size, information advantage, 
or control over a critical asset [96, 97] so the business partner can obtain a share of the 
business risk as a part of the contractual agreement.  
4.10. Supply chain security 
The terrorist attacks at the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, 
brought attention to security in trade, for more reasons than just the attacks. Three factors 
can be outlined: first, the globalization of world trade depends on and is generated by the 
free flow of people, goods, and information; second, the increasing demands from 
businesses for efficient supply chain operations; and third, the increasing threats of terrorist 
attacks [98]. The last reason can be seen as an increase in perceived risk for terrorist attacks. 
This factor can define illegal and antagonistic threats, of which terrorists are one type. 
Therefore, supply chain security management can be defined as, “the application of policies, 
procedures, and technology to protect supply chain assets from theft, damage, or terrorism, and to 
prevent the introduction of unauthorized contraband, people, or weapons of mass destruction into the 
supply chain” [83]. The only problem with this definition is that it does not address the origin 
of the threat or risk. The five sources of supply chain risks provide that. Supply chain 
security needs to adjust its policies, procedures, and technology to protect the supply chain 
from all five risk sources. The flip side of supply chain security is supply chain resilience, or 
a supply chain’s ability to withstand and recover from an incident [83]. Supply chain risk 
should incorporate security and resilience, where resilience also must handle a near miss 
incident that affects the performance of the supply chain and from which it needs to recover. 
Present supply chain security research outlines several changes for how security in a supply 
chain should be approached. First, supply chain security should incorporate not only theft 
prevention but also anti-terrorism measures. Second, the focus is now on global issues and 
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not just local or national issues [99]. Third, when conducting contingency planning, the 
concept of crisis management is to be included to obtain better resilience. Last, security is no 
longer an internal corporate question but rather an issue for all actors within the supply 
chain [83]. 
[100] suggest that methods and ideas from total quality management can be used 
successfully to increase supply chain security. The main idea is the lesson from quality 
management that sample inspection is expensive and useless at the end of the production 
line. Just like in quality management, supply chain security becomes more effective and less 
expensive by implementing the right management approach, technology, and re-
engineering operational processes. [85] state that security should be integrated throughout 
the entire supply chain to be successful at a reasonable price. This opinion is supported by 
several other authors [74, 83, 101, 102, 103]. 
4.11. Supply chain security programs 
Several new security programmes were launched in the aftermath of the World Trade 
Centre terrorist attack to protect international cargo flow from being abused for criminal 
(primarily terrorist) intentions without compromising supply chain efficiency. The U.S. 
Customs Office launched several programmes such as the Customs-Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), Container Security Initiative (CSI), the 24-hour rule, etc. These 
security programmes address different aspects of supply chain security and target different 
parts of a transport chain. The link between these security programmes is that they involve 
all parties or stakeholders in supply chain security [104]. The effects from these programs 
both in order to handle security threats and their impact on different logistics processes 
have been addressed in a few papers [105, 106, 107, 108, 109]. [110] states that the C-TPAT 
certification will probably have a negative impact, mostly on small enterprises whiles large 
firms instead may have the possibility to trade-off the security costs with benefits related to 
supply chain transparency. [111] demonstrates the economical and competitive advantages 
for large and small shippers becoming FAST-approved (Free And Secure Trade). The 
acquisition of the FAST status may provide shippers with faster trans-border operations and 
consequently a substantial advantage on the export market [96]. [112] emphasize that 
efficiency and security in supply chains are closely related to each others, since higher 
security may reduce Customs delays. The relationship between security, efficiency and 
custom activities is clearly found in the AEO-program.  
Other types of security programmes existed before the attacks on the World Trade Centre. 
These programmes were designed primarily to address theft problems within the transport 
business (TAPA FSR and TSR, etc.) [113]. The big difference between security programmes 
before and after the terrorist attacks is that afterwards, authorities (mainly U.S.) took the lead 
in developing and implementing these programmes. Before September 11, 2001, security was 
something the business itself handled. The implementation of these programmes has so far 
mainly occurred in the old western countries in North America and in Europe. 
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Other types of security programmes existed before the attacks on the World Trade Centre. 
These programmes were designed primarily to address theft problems within the transport 
business. The big difference between security programmes before and after the terrorist 
attacks is that afterwards, authorities (mainly U.S.) took the lead in developing and 
implementing these programmes. Before September 11, 2001, security was something the 
business itself handled. The implementation of these programmes has so far mainly 
occurred in the old western countries in North America and in Europe. 
The cost for implementing these programs alters the current collaboration models with 
regards to risk and profit sharing within the supply chain. The risks for antagonist threats 
are depended on the local environment. This shall be compared with that the security 
programs advocates one to three different security levels which shall solve the problem. 
This leads to that the security level is adjusted towards the security programs instead of the 
local threat. This may lead to that the security cost is higher than needed but a 
standardisation within the supply/transport chain in security may result in better 
collaboration. The political reasons behind the different supply chain security programs is 
most likely the fear for terrorist attacks which according to [32] depends more on the 
proliferation of mass media than development of new weapons. This is the context to 
understand the content and effects from fear of terrorist against international trade. 
Nevertheless the supply chain security programs provides collateral benefits like better 
product control, lesser shrinkage and better incident prevention by reducing threat 
opportunities. 
The compliance with these different logistics security programs are based on different 
reasons. The compliance with business logistics security programs (like TAPA:s) are based 
on customer requirements. This depends on the simple fact that these programs are focusing 
on theft prevention. The governmental logistics security programs like AEO, C-TPAT, CSI 
etc. are on other hand more focusing on preventing terrorist activities. These programs 
normally also contains some kind of disadvantage for the own organisation if not 
compliance. Therefore are the governmental logistics security programs entail with a higher 
likelihood of compliance due to that need for compliance are not based on a risk assessment 
about the potential causes and impacts for antagonistic threats but on a general business 
assessment. For legal businesses, the AEO, C-TPAT, etc., are both a global supply chain 
headache and a business opportunity, depending on the risk for theft and counterfeiting for 
that company [114]. Irrespective of the difference in compliance reasons, the governmental 
logistics security programs may result in collateral benefits like lower cost for theft and 
better working conditions for the employees but there are still to be demonstrated that the 
terrorism preventing logistics security programs actually reduces the risk for non-
economical-driven antagonistic threats because it’s their primer reason for existing. 
5. Conclusions 
First, [1] clearly points out the effects of the WTC terrorist attacks on the global flow of 
goods. The effect may be indirect, but it was devastating. This event along with non-
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antagonistic events such as Hurricane Katrina and other natural disasters demonstrated 
their power to disrupt or cause uncertainty in supply chains. Second, terrorism conducts 
fund raising through criminal activities, which leads to that terrorism represents all 
antagonistic threats. Third, the tools and strategies for handling antagonistic threats are 
partly governmental (police and justice system) and partly consequence handling (insurance 
businesses, conventions and business contingency).  
For terrorist threats, it is useful to refer to transferred and perceived threatening pictures 
[31]. The perceived or actual marketing strategies which link a company or organisation 
with certain values/states/advocates will affect the risks for terrorist threats to the 
organisation/business/market position. The key issue in this conclusion is that the perceived 
relationship between a company/organisation and values/states/advocates is made by the 
potential terrorist. Therefore is it important for a holistic threats assessment to include and 
consider these different relationships between an organisation and different 
values/states/advocates with regard to direct and more important indirect connections.  
Historically, terrorist groups and organisations have been closely related to a certain 
geographical area and executed in that area. This is a valid statement for terrorist 
organisations such as IRA and the Basque separatist movement, even if both have 
conducted attacks outside their fighting area but within their targets (e.g., in UK but outside 
Northern Ireland, and in Spain but outside the Basque province). Those types of 
organisations only constitute a threat if the operations are carried out in that area and if the 
logistics operation possesses any real or symbolic value for the terrorist organisations. The 
strong relationship between different terrorist groups and geographical area may be 
reduced when referring to international terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda, but the 
targets should still possess a symbolic value for the terrorist organisations, even if the value 
is public fear. 
The vulnerability of the supply chain is transmitted to the transport network. This depends 
on the simple fact that transports and freight activities physically bring the facilities of a 
supply chain together. Therefore, risks, uncertainties, and vulnerabilities in the supply chain 
and the transport network affect, contribute, and neutralize each other. Supply chain 
security is indented to safeguard the supply chain (in this meaning the transport and freight 
activities) from different antagonistic threats and thereby reduce the vulnerability of 
modern global trade.  
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